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Abstract 
In its assessment of the origins and early development of the World Social Forum this article 
challenges traditional understandings of the Forum as representing ‘globalisation from 
below’. By tracing the intricate relations among elements of business, civil society, and the 
Workers’ Party in the first years of the Forum, this article reveals the major role played by a 
corporate movement stemming from the Brazilian democratisation process in the 1980s, and 
how this combined with the transformed agenda of the Workers’ Party as it gained higher 
political offices to constrain the Forum’s activities from the outset. In so doing, this article 
challenges not only widespread conceptions of the Forum as a counter-hegemonic 
alternative but also current critiques concerning its subsequent limitations. Furthermore, it 
reveals how traditional understandings of the World Social Forum and of global civil society 
are underpinned by flawed assumptions which typecast political activities in the global 
‘South’. 
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Few institutions have been more widely regarded as ‘manifestations for progressive 
and counter-hegemonic globalisation and an emergent counter-hegemonic civil society’ 
than the World Social Forum (WSF) (Hernandez 2010: 41). The ideals of the WSF’s original 
April 2001 Charter of Principles would appear to support such a perception, with their 
emphasis on ‘democratic debate of ideas’ in an ‘open meeting place’ of ‘groups and 
movements of civil society that are opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of the 
world by capital and any kind of imperialism’ (WSF 2006). 
In recent years, however, the WSF has become increasingly criticised for 
transforming into an NGO ‘trade fair’ and for having become ‘co-opted by the more elite, 
institutionalised, and reformist forces, at the expense of putatively more radical mass 
movements’, especially as it has expanded beyond its Brazilian origins (Conway 2008: 94). 
According to Worth and Buckley (2009: 649), for instance, the WSF ‘has become a funfair for 
the expression of ideas from academics and NGO/government workers, which has led to a 
form of elitism that the WSF attempted to avoid at its inception’. 
 This article, on the other hand, provides evidence to indicate that the elitist 
dimensions of the WSF are far from new, and have been a key aspect of the institution since 
its origins at the turn of the millennium. While it is traditional to portray the WSF as 
spearheading ‘globalisation from below’, this article will reveal how from the outset many 
dimensions of the development of the WSF do not match such a description. 
 The distinction between globalisation from ‘above’ and ‘below’ is commonly 
attributed to Falk, who has distinguished between ‘corporate globalisation as “globalisation 
from above” and civic globalisation as “globalisation from below”’ (Falk 2004: 17). The key 
actors that are said to be involved in promoting ‘globalisation from above’ are 
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‘statist/corporate’, in contrast to ‘globalisation from below’ that provides a ‘counterweight’ 
to such actors (Falk 2004: 83). 
 The notion of ‘globalisation from below’ is closely related to the substantial body of 
literature that has developed since the end of the Cold War on the development of 
transnational and global civil society (Baker 2002: 120). Authors on this subject have been 
reluctant to provide a clear definition of global civil society, describing it as a ‘fuzzy and 
contested concept’ (Anheier et al. 2001: 11). For-profit actors and political parties in power 
have tended to be excluded from present-day understandings of civil society (Edwards 2009: 
28). It is common to argue that global civil society is ‘an unfinished project’, involving non-
governmental actors and networks across national boundaries that ‘tend to pluralise power 
and problematise violence; consequently their “peaceful” or “civil” effects are felt 
everywhere’ (Keane 2003: 8). Central to much of the literature on transnational and global 
civil society has been an emphasis on a process ‘that is “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” 
and that involves the struggle for emancipatory goals‘ (Kaldor 2003: 142). It has been 
common to turn to civic activism in the global South as ‘indicative of something moving in 
different societies across the globe towards a new vitality of “bottom-up” movement in civil 
society as a counterweight to the hegemonic power structure and ideology’, in contrast to 
‘top-down’ NGOs based in the global North (Cox 1999: 13). 
 The WSF has been interpreted as the key exemplar of ‘bottom-up’ approaches and 
‘globalisation from below’. Smith, for instance, draws a distinction between ‘global policy 
arenas’ that ‘are...dominated by government and corporate actors’ and the WSF process 
which is viewed as ‘an example of how social movements and their allies work to generate 
alternatives to government-led initiatives for world order’ (Smith 2008: 199, 206). Others, 
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however, have viewed the development of the WSF as indicating ‘globalisation from the 
middle’ (Waterman 2004: 87), given the ‘NGOisation of the WSF’ (Santos 2006: 70). 
 In both cases, the traditional account of the emergence of the WSF emphasises its 
roots in social movement activism. It is now common in the literature on the development 
of international relations in the post-Cold War era to refer to the ‘activist origins of the WSF’ 
(Halliday 2010: 128). It is claimed, for instance, that ‘the Zapatistas were certainly a primary 
force in bringing about the development of the World Social Forum’ (Shor 2010: 24). The 
WSF is also commonly presented ‘as heir to the wave of resistance against corporate 
globalisation that burst on to the public radar screen during the protests against the World 
Trade Organisation in Seattle in 1999’ (Juris 2006: 208). 
The counter-demonstration to the 1999 Davos meeting of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) by organisations including ATTAC (Association pour la Taxation des 
Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens) and MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra) 
has been described as ‘the start of the movement to create a “parallel summit” to the 
hidden, elitist and technocratic managers of globalisation symbolised by Davos where they 
got together with their own “organic intellectuals”’ (Munck 2007: 83). The first World Social 
Forum in 2001 has therefore been viewed as ‘largely an “anti-Davos” people’s assembly’ 
(Smith 2008: 209). One of the founders of the forum, the Israel-born Brazilian businessman 
Oded Grajew, has described his initial ambition for the World Social Forum as ‘to have a 
space to make people who have the same vision to be together and to join forces, 
strengthen the movement’ (Paget-Clarke 2004). Traditionally, this has been interpreted as 
having been ‘inspire[d]’ by the ‘Zapatista model of G[lobal] C[ivil] S[ociety] as global public 
sphere, a space of encounter, deliberation’ (Chesters 2004: 332). 
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While there has been a consensus around the role of these ideas in the conception 
of the WSF, responsibility for initiating the Forum has been a source of tension among those 
who have claimed to be among the founders, especially between Grajew and Bernard 
Cassen, the French leader of ATTAC. Cassen’s (2003) book Tout a Commencé à Porto 
Alegre... Mille Forums Sociaux! [Everything started in Porto Alegre... A thousand social 
forums!] attributed the conception of the World Social Forum to himself. To Grajew, the 
book minimised the contributions of local actors and exaggerated the role of European 
ones, replicating ‘...the position of the coloniser in front of the colonised. He [Cassen] does 
not manage to admit that Brazilians had the idea and moved the process forward. It is an 
undue appropriation of the initiative. [...] It looks as if this was a history that began in 
Europe, in the First World. He minimises the role of Brazil and developing countries in all the 
process’ (Eichenberg 2003).  
Other authors on the origins of the WSF have laid greater emphasis on the role 
played by Brazilian actors (Teivanen 2002: 623; Schönleitner 2003: 128; von Bülow 
forthcoming). Labour and social movement organisations in Brazil such as the CUT (Central 
Única dos Trabalhadores) and MST have been singled out for their part in the origins of the 
Forum (Teivanen 2004: 123). So too has the Brazilian Workers’ Party (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores - PT), which has generally been seen to have been ‘crucial to the 
establishment of the WSF and its open space paradigm’ (Gautney 2009: 209). The role of 
Brazilian actors such as these, combined with the chosen location for the first World Social 
Forum in Porto Alegre, is thought to have helped ensure that the formation of the WSF 
resonated ‘with a strong trajectory of social mobilisation’ and may be interpreted as 
representative of ‘globalisation from below’ (Perera 2003: 76). In the most advanced 
exploration of the role of Brazilian actors in the development of the World Social Forum to 
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date, von Bülow (forthcoming: 21) shows the importance of the international links Brazilian 
civil society actors had developed in the preceding years in ensuring that the Forum had 
significant international participation from the outset. 
This article challenges not only the globalist narrative of the WSF’s origins which 
sidelines the significant influence of local Brazilian structures but also the localist account 
which highlights popular and civil society actors in Brazil, as neither pays sufficient attention 
to the intricacies of the close relations between business, party political, regional and later 
national governmental, and social actors, which were central to the origins and early years 
of the WSF. Through its analysis of the role of these relations in the origins and early years 
of the WSF, this article will show how the traditional perspective of the WSF as embodying a 
counter-hegemonic ‘globalisation from below’ emanating from grassroots actors 
counterbalancing an ‘above’ dominated by business and governmental actors, does not 
provide an adequate picture. In doing so, this article will reveal how the wider literature on 
transnational and global civil society needs to move beyond simplistic assumptions which 
divide the world between ‘top-down’ NGOs based in the global North, and ‘bottom-up’ 
social movements in the global South (Baker 2002; Anheier et al. 2001). Whereas existing 
work on social movements and civil society organisations has endeavoured to isolate these 
actors from the business sector and political parties, this article reveals the extensive 
relations among these sectors even in one of the most paradigmatic examples of 
transnational social mobilisation. 
While it cannot be claimed that the origins of the WSF represented ‘globalisation 
from above’ in the traditional sense of being driven by Northern-hemisphere businesses and 
governmental actors, and although the role of social movement actors must be 
acknowledged, this article will explore the limitations of considering the Southern-
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hemisphere origins of the WSF to be ‘globalisation from below’. In particular, this article 
aims to challenge existing narratives by highlighting that (i) in its immediate origins the WSF 
is closely rooted in the corporate movement for social responsibility in Brazil rather than 
simply in anti-capitalist social movements, and (ii) these roots were supported by the close 
collaborative relations among elements of Brazilian business and the political and civil elites 
promoted by the PT, which developed at the regional level in Brazil prior to the creation of 
the Forum and which accentuated with the Party’s ascent to the presidency in 2003. 
The element that binds together these two propositions, and a commonly 
overlooked feature in existing literature, is the personal and ideological connections that the 
Brazilian corporate social responsibility movement had with the PT – which was to go on to 
support moderate business-friendly stances during its first two administrations – and the 
role that these links played in the organisation and consolidation of the WSF in its first years. 
These connections have historical roots that placed both groups, the Brazilian corporate 
social responsibility movement and the PT and its popular allies, as part of the progressive 
movements that accompanied the ‘controlled’ democratisation of the 1980s, as rising 
political actors in the 1990s, and as governmental associates with the ascent of the PT to 
power in 2003. 
Moreover, this article considers that the origins of the WSF and the role played by 
this corporate group in it were favourably shaped by the transformation of the PT from an 
anti-systemic social movement party - born from the convergence of the new labour 
movement, popular-base groups, grassroots Catholic organisations, and clandestine leftwing 
militants - to a party of government advancing a ‘social neoliberal’ agenda, where state-led 
social policies are supported by neoliberal economic policies (Singer 2009; de Oliveira 2006; 
Rollember Mollo and Saad-Filho 2006; Morais and Saad-Filho 2005; Samuels 2004b). 
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Although the moderation of the PT’s socialist and social movement project has been amply 
studied (Ribeiro 2008; Hunter 2007; Samuels 2004a; Marques and Mendes 2006; Paiva 
2006; Panizza 2005), the implications this moderation had for the WSF have been rarely 
engaged in the literature. Santos Elias (forthcoming) emphasises the dilemma the WSF 
project presented for the PT in the early 2000s, given its dual identity as a social movement 
representative and as a competitor in electoral politics, and shows the prevalence of the 
latter. This article, on the other hand, goes further by exploring the combined role played by 
this dual identity of the PT and its co-evolving relationship with the corporate actors 
significant in the creation and early development of WSF. In this regard, this article provides 
a missing element that goes beyond both the most recent studies of the WSF’s evolution in 
Brazil, and the wider literature on civil society and social movements, which has commonly 
attempted to isolate examination of the third sector from the work of political parties and of 
business (Edwards 2009: 28). As this article will show, the close relationship between 
business and the PT in the origins of the World Social Forum constrained from the outset 
the functioning of the Forum, which developed as an arena for discussion rather than a 
mechanism for the advancement of more radical alternatives to neoliberal globalisation. 
Accordingly, this article traces the origins of the WSF through the changes in the PT 
agenda and its links with the CSR movement through three phases: from their origins in the 
democratic transition in the 1980s, through the PT’s first moderation and regional electoral 
success in the 1990s, to the moment the PT reached the presidency in 2003 and the 
Brazilian national government openly promoted the WSF. The first two phases are discussed 
in the next section of this article, while the subsequent section explores how these actors 
helped not only to bring about the WSF, but to moderate and politicise its programme. 
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This article is based upon a broad range of primary source material on the Brazilian 
dimension of the origins of the WSF, including interviews with WSF participants and other 
civil society actors in Brazil (both published and in-person interviews), as well as primary 
documents and publications of institutions involved in the development of the WSF, and a 
diverse array of local press articles. The material consulted was not restricted to those 
directly involved in the WSF process in Brazil, but also related to those involved in other civil 
society organs in Brazil. 
 
The Brazilian origins of the WSF: civil, corporate and partisan 
While it must be noted that the roots of the WSF cannot be attributed to a single 
individual, Oded Grajew was, as the next section of this article will show, central to the 
Forum’s establishment. Existing accounts of the origins of the WSF tend to neglect how, in 
Grajew’s words, the idea for the WSF came to him only after he had ‘tried for some time to 
introduce social responsibility in the World Economic Forum’ (Paget-Clarke 2004) and 
following his efforts to reform rather than to challenge the WEF, stating at the time that the 
Forum was not against Davos but that ‘Davos is against Porto Alegre’ (Toledo 2001) by not 
opening up to society. These proposals were discussed directly with the leader of WEF, 
Klaus Schwab, with whom Grajew had personal acquaintance given that the successful toy 
firm he founded in the 1970s, Grow Jogos, was 25% owned by a German firm represented 
by Schwab’s brother (Grajew 2005). 
The background of Grajew illuminates the complexity of the Brazilian context leading 
to the origins of the WSF, its relevance, and its contrast with the global narratives outlined 
at the start of this article. Grajew was well known in the country before the creation of the 
WSF on account of two factors: (i) he was among the leaders of the business sector 
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supportive of the PT, and (ii) he was one of the most outspoken advocates for corporate 
social responsibility. Beyond his personal role, it is through the confluence of these two 
cleavages, and the political structures underlying them, that the WSF became a feasible 
project.  
In particular, the fundamental difference between the corporate social responsibility 
movement in Brazil and that in the US and Europe, is the ideological and institutional 
association with diverse social and political personalities involved in the democratisation 
movement. This connection, rather than reducing it to an exclusively business programme, 
positioned certain elements of the corporate responsibility discourse as a legitimate civil 
agenda to be shared by a number of popular actors, which explains the capacity that Grajew 
and others displayed in mobilising key social actors despite their business roots.  This was 
possible because an eclectic range of social, corporate and political relations existed 
previously in Brazil and became ‘activated’ in the organisation of the first WSF.  
These relations largely stem from the context from where they originated. Prior the 
1970s the centrality of the state in the industrialisation and institutionalisation of the 
country is said to have shaped ‘the most full blown system of corporatism in Latin America’ 
(Collier and Collier 1991: 128).1 However, the gradual democratisation process in the late 
1970s and 1980s implied the transformation of authoritarian corporatist structures into 
more open arrangements accompanying the activation of multiple new political actors 
(Collier 1995; Keck 1992; Collier and Collier 1991; O’Donnell 1977). Central among these 
new actors was the PT, founded formally in 1980, with a project of reversing the 
authoritarian and monopolistic organisation of Brazilian state-society relations and economy 
until that point, and providing an institutional representation to previously excluded sectors 
of society (PT 1980; PT 1979). 
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The PT aimed to provide a voice to a diverse array of social sectors, with its multiple 
founders including intellectuals from the organised left, clandestine Marxists, Paulista 
intelligentsia and politicians, and Catholic groupings linked with the CNBB, the Brazilian 
Confederation of Catholic Bishops, the public policy body of the Catholic Church in the 
country (Ribeiro 2008). Such diverse influences were not only behind the ‘novo sindicalismo’ 
represented by the CUT, the main union confederation associated with the PT, but also 
behind the formation of rural and civil organisations, such as the Landless Workers 
Movement MST created in 1984 and the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis 
IBASE created in 1981, all of them among the founding organisations of the WSF in 2000.2 
Grajew was to play a fundamental role in bringing these actors together in the creation of 
the WSF, and in order to understand his role it is necessary to explore his ‘corporate’ 
activities during the democratic transition, and his engagement with the PT and its allies in 
the two decades preceding the Forum’s creation.   
As early as the mid-1980s Grajew played a central part in the formation of a new 
business sector supportive of a ‘social pact involving various different segments of the 
market, labourers and businessmen’ (Grajew 2005) in contrast to the traditional corporatist 
relations that previously associated Brazilian industry with military governments and socially 
repressive agendas. In 1987, two years after the first civil – though not fully democratic – 
government was elected, Grajew co-founded the PNBE (Pensamento Nacional das Bases 
Empresariais), an association of young businessmen promoting ‘dialogue between 
employees, businessmen, and democracy as a whole’ (Ibid.) which separated from the 
powerful Federation of Industries of São Paulo (FIESP).3 From the outset the agenda of the 
PNBE was to position this ‘new’ business sector in relation to wider social questions such as 
political reform and education, vis-à-vis the Constitutional Assembly that was to approve 
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the new Constitution that would install a fully fledged democratic system in the country 
(Bianchi 2001). At the same time, this sector of business started to develop relations with 
the new labour movement around the CUT and the PT, which then had a strong socialist 
agenda aiming to end ‘the exploitation of man by man’ (PT 1979) and to struggle for the 
political inclusion of ‘all those exploited by the capitalist system’ (PT 1980). By 1984 Grajew 
and his group claimed to have pioneered forging business relationships with trade unions 
and the trade union federation CUT: Grajew claimed that he was the first businessman to 
enter the premises of the CUT in São Paulo (Brum 2005), and among the first businessmen 
‘to approach Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva [Lula]’ (Grajew 2005). By 1987 Grajew’s PNBE 
organised trips to Israel and to the US to explore their experiences in social pacts and debt 
management, inviting not only business leaders but that of CUT and its rival federation, 
which later became the federation FS (Força Sindical). This collaborative approach was 
promoted at a time when the official position of the main industry organisations was of 
rejection and deep suspicion for the union movement and its candidates, with the leader of 
FIESP claiming previous to the 1989 presidential elections that ‘if Lula wins, 800,000 
businessmen will leave the country’ (Costa 2002). 
The relationship of the PT with these corporate groups evolved alongside its gradual 
transition from its radical popular roots towards more moderate political stances. This 
transformation started when the PT gained its first major political offices in the late 1980s, 
gaining control of cities such as Porto Alegre, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte, and moved 
forward when the PT was elected to state governments from the mid-1990s onwards (Bittar 
2003). The PT’s mode of governing at the time was characterised by the promotion of 
inclusive democratic mechanisms such as participatory budgeting and popular management 
(Souza 2001; Sousa Santos 1998). These mechanisms were claimed to prevent ‘corporate 
13 
 
domination of the democratic process and … [to give] progressive governments and popular 
mobilisations leverage against corporate power’ (Ponniah and Fisher 2003: 5). Porto Alegre in 
particular became a flagship of participatory budgeting worldwide – selected as one of the 
top 40 urban innovations in the world in the 1996 UN Urban Habitat Conference - a point 
claimed to have partly motivated the decision to host the first WSF in this city (Leite 2005; 
Teivainen 2002).  
However, these experiences in political office also contributed towards the 
moderation of the PT’s political programme. Francisco ‘Chico’ Whitaker, one of the co-
founders of the WSF, Catholic activist, and the majority leader of the PT in the São Paulo 
Municipal Chamber in the early 1990s, considered that prior to these experiences the PT 
had a very elementary vision of government and a poor opinion of political alliances with 
other groups (Gonçalves Couto 1994). But the experience of having to run large cities and 
states started to differentiate governing PT members, who adopted an administrative 
approach to politics - the idea that it is possible to ‘govern for everyone’ - from non-
governing party leaders that considered that the PT should ‘govern everyone’ from a 
workers’ perspective (Gonçalves Couto 1994: 156; Macaulay 1996). This importance of the 
first group grew along with the PT’s electoral success, reinforced by the impact this had on 
the Party’s finances: Ribeiro (2008) shows that by mid-1990s the PT’s budget consisted 
mostly of contributions from members in office and funds distributed by the State to the 
political parties in accordance with their number of deputies in the Congress (under a 
system called ‘Fundo Partidário’). Furthermore, by 1995 certain PT candidates started to 
accept contributions from private firms, which although legal were criticised by the left wing 
of the Party. To such accusations, a pragmatic response by a PT federal deputy was that the 
party would only be electorally viable if it acted within the boundaries allowed by the 
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legislation (Ribeiro 2008: 105). Several authors concur that the moderation of the radical 
aspects of the PT’s political agenda was not only driven by the experience of governing but 
by the consequences of Lula’s defeat in the presidential campaigns of 1994 and 1998, which 
triggered an internal revision of the party’s strategy (Rollemberg Mollo and Saad-Filho 2006; 
Samuels 2004a). In particular after 1998 the PT’s decided to move away from explicit 
rejections of capitalism, the position advanced by the more radical elements in the WSF and 
some of the PT’s founding intelligentsia, towards criticism of its ‘unsustainable’ practices.    
During this period the businessmen within the PNBE expanded their agenda beyond 
the enhancement of democratic institutions, while maintaining a critical discourse towards 
governing and dominating classes, monopolies and oligopolies, and regional oligarchies, 
pointing out the lack of alternatives to authoritarianism, populism and neoliberalism in 
Brazil (Bianchi 2001: 137). In 1993, Grajew founded another business association, under the 
name of CIVES (Associação Brasileira de Empresários pela Ciudadania). This group emanated 
from the PNBE, which had become polarised between supporters and opponents of the 
neoliberal policies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration. CIVES had a vision 
advocating the development of citizenship, democracy, social justice and business ethics. 
More importantly, CIVES, which was part of the first WSF commission and is one of the 
members of the Brazilian WSF Committee, not only represented a social business position 
but was an explicitly political business association, as its main goal was to organise 
‘empresarios petistas’, businessmen sharing the agenda of the PT. Thus, through the 1990s 
Grajew spearheaded ‘making the links, the bridges, between the Workers Party in Brazil and 
the business sector – supporting Workers Party candidates and Lula for many years’ (Paget-
Clarke 2004). In this manner, Grajew and CIVES became central in the campaign to enhance 
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corporate support for the PT, and by 1994 Grajew led Lula’s candidacy Business Committee 
(Pomar 1995).  
Grajew and the Brazilian businessmen around the PNBE and CIVES also became 
active promoters of approaches to the organisation of civil society that facilitated greater 
collaboration between corporate and civil sectors. Early in the 1990s, Grajew, as President 
of the Brazilian Association of Toy Manufacturers ABRINQ, created the ABRINQ Foundation, 
with support from business as well as UNICEF and the Kellogg Foundation, dedicated to 
improving children’s conditions in Brazil, by 1993 becoming its full-time president. Five years 
later, in 1998, Grajew and his associates created the Ethos Institute for Business and Social 
Responsibility, with the mission ‘to mobilise, sensitise and help companies manage their 
business in a socially responsible manner, making them partners in building a just and 
sustainable society.’ (Ethos 2010). Ethos became Brazil’s representative of ‘social’ business, 
and the key promoter of private regulatory projects, liaising with international organisations 
on these matters and operating as a local consultancy and think tank. Moreover, in the 
coming years it enjoyed the support of international bodies promoting environmental and 
social standards such as the Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative [GRI] and other 
corporate-oriented initiatives. It also had the support of the main national trade 
federations, and of the most visible companies in the country, including a wide range of 
state companies, in particular the oil giant Petrobras. Ethos’ membership rose from 11 
companies in 1998 to 1,391 by 2011, half of them small and micro-enterprises (Vieira 2009). 
Its membership is estimated to represent 35% of the country’s GDP (CSR360 2012).  
The model followed by Grajew and his associates, linking civil society with private 
business, proved successful, and businessmen around Ethos continued forming NGOs on 
this basis, such as the Akatu Institute, a conscious consumption NGO spun off from Ethos in 
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2001 (Akatu 2012) and the Nossa São Paulo (NSP) Network chaired by Grajew and aiming to 
establish common agendas between society and state to improve quality of life in that city 
(NSP 2012). Other Ethos/PNBE leaders founded CSOs alongside recognised civil activists: 
Ricardo Young, former President of Ethos, and Eduardo Capobianco, Director of the Society 
of Alcohol and Sugar Producers, co-founded in 2000 the NGO Transparency Brazil, along 
with Chico Whitaker, PT member and one of the co-ideologues of the WSF (TBrasil 2012).  
 By the end of the 1990s Grajew actively promoted the link between the CSR 
movement, business–civil society partnerships and the PT programme. In 1998, the year the 
Ethos Institute was created, Grajew wrote an article in Folha de São Paulo entitled ‘The 
candidate of Businessmen’ in light of the coming presidential elections. Without mentioning 
Lula – albeit signing the article as ‘Businessman, General Coordinator of CIVES and 
President-Director of the ABRINQ Foundation’ - Grajew called businessmen to endorse the 
candidate committed to reducing social inequality, generating employment, reducing 
inflation, stimulating exports, and promoting partnerships between business and civil 
society (Grajew 1998). The implications of this eclectic agenda in the development of the 
WSF are examined in the next section.   
 
A new perspective of the development of the WSF 
The previous section revealed that among the different popular, civil and corporate groups 
in Brazil that played a part in the inception and origins of the WSF there existed significant 
linkages both with each other and with the PT. The following paragraphs outline the role of 
these linkages in the origins of the WSF and show how these linkages, rather than 
influencing the WSF to be an instrument of action against capitalism, promoted from the 
start a moderate position compatible with the notion of social responsibility, which prefers 
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voluntary and non-coercive intervention over more mobilised and aggressive political 
tactics.  
In February 2000, during a visit to Paris, Grajew discussed the idea of the WSF with 
his friend Chico Whitaker, who was at the time Executive Secretary of the Brazilian 
Commission of Justice and Peace (CBJP), an organ of the CNBB. This idea was subsequently 
presented to Bernard Cassen of ATTAC and Le Monde Diplomatique, who apparently 
proposed that the Forum be held in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre (Leite 2005: 78). Back 
in Brazil, Grajew used his contacts in business organisations such as CIVES and Ethos – over 
both of which he had presided – and in labour and social movement organisations 
associated with the PT, such as CUT and the MST, to form the organising committee for the 
first World Social Forum, which included IBASE, ABONG (the Association of Brazilian NGOs) 
and the CBJP, plus two foreign organisations, ATTAC and the Center for Global Justice: 
Then, in one of the meeting rooms here [at the Ethos Institute], I called six 
other friends. Chico Whitaker is for the Catholic Church movement, so (to 
add to that) I called people from the social movements, the NGO (non-
governmental organisations) movement, the MST (Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra -- Landless Workers' Movement), and the 
human rights movement. Six people from six organisations, Chico Whitaker 
for the Catholic movement, and me for the business sector. And I told them 
the idea (Grajew 2005) 
Previous ideological affinities between this diverse range of organisations are evident in 
their respective Charters of Principles, which highlight as common goals the promotion and 
enhancement of democracy and participation. The PNBE, IBASE and Ethos express support 
for negotiation and social debate, public and private orientation towards equality and social 
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concerns, economic development with social justice, and social and environmental 
sustainability, organised around a market economy but with profit as a developmental tool 
and domestic markets prioritised. While not neoliberal, the goals of these organisations are 
also not anti-capitalist. Similar objectives are present in the Charter of Principles of the WSF, 
the first of which defines the Forum as an open space for the democratic debate of ideas, 
for civil society groups that oppose neoliberalism and a ‘world ruled by capital’, and demand 
instead a globalisation with solidarity, respecting human rights and the environment, with 
institutions serving social justice, equality and sovereignty (WSF 2002). 
According to Grajew, after the initial conception of the Forum was discussed, he and 
his group contacted the local authorities of the city of Porto Alegre and the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul, as hosting of the WSF in Porto Alegre had been viewed as particularly 
‘appropriate ... because the city had been governed by the Workers’ Party since 1988 and is 
celebrated for its innovative participatory budget process, grounded in a radical reform of 
the relationship between the public, government and business’ (Karides and Ponniah, 2008: 
9). It is worth noting that at the time of the first Forum the leaders of municipal and federal 
governments were personal acquaintances of Grajew and his group. Among these persons 
were Raul Pont, Olivio Dutra and Tarso Genro.  Pont is one of the founders of the PT along 
with Lula and others, and current Secretary General of the party, while Dutra is a former 
union leader, who was appointed Minister of Cities when Lula became president. 
With the official involvement of the PT in the creation of the WSF the previously 
principally ideological linkages started to assume a more official form: not only did two 
representatives from the state and city become part of the organising committee of the first 
event (Agência Folha 2001), but these two constituencies provided much of the funding, a 
role that the President of the country at the time, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, considered 
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inappropriate (França 2001). This position can be directly contrasted to the one President 
Lula Da Silva would take later on. Official figures calculated by IBASE and ABONG, the two 
organisations that acted as financial controller for the events held in Brazil, estimated that 
state contributions for the Forums of 2001 and 2002 represented almost half the total 
income (Lopez et al. 2006), granted indirectly through the provision of venues, 
communication and transport infrastructure, albeit no official numbers for these 
contributions exist. The other part of the funding came from international agencies such as 
the Ford Foundation, NOVIB and ICCO, which were facilitated by Grajew’s experience as 
leader of the ABRINQ Foundation and by the contacts of IBASE: 
Then, we went to Porto Alegre to see the situation. I went to the Ford 
Foundation for money, for the first secretariat. Half of the money we had in 
Brazil, and then I went to New York to speak with them to have more money 
to establish the secretariat. (Paget-Clarke 2004) 
Several observers have noted that the role of the PT was not merely supportive but 
fundamental for the fruition of the WSF: Santos (2006: 55) has argued that without PT 
support ‘it would have been impossible, at least in Brazil, to organise the WSF with the 
ambition that characterised it from the start’ and Santos Elias (forthcoming) affirms that the 
PT governments of the state of Rio Grande do Sul and Porto Alegre city were essential in 
providing the physical and logistical infrastructure of the first event. Candido Grzybowski, 
IBASE’s Director, admitted in 2009 that ‘…no forum would exist in Brazil without help from 
the state’ (Magalhães and Flor 2009). 
However, as Diaz (2006: 97) concluded, ‘if an organisation depends on public funding 
for its operations, its effectiveness depends on the party in power’, a relation that was quite 
clear for the PT public authorities behind the Forum from the beginning. In this regard, 
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Santos Elias (forthcoming) indicates that the PT representatives attending the first meeting 
of the Organising Committee of the WSF were there on behalf of National Direction of the 
party, suggesting an institutional interest by the PT in the event. Moreover, PT public 
officials considered the event convenient for both the city and the state, and were active in 
its promotion: the Governor of the state asked in his opening speech at the World 
Parliamentary Forum for ‘the support of members of Parliament in different countries to 
guarantee the realisation of the WSF outcomes in Porto Alegre’ (Santos Elias forthcoming), 
while the city’s prefect did so in a tour through Europe in 2000 (France Presse 2000). It 
should be noted that the events are estimated to have mobilised around US$50 million in 
2003 for transport, food and housing, a figure that encouraged the Indian tourism sector to 
argue along these lines when discussing moving the event to India in 2004. Grajew himself is 
reported to have said in 2001 that the Forum was contributing economically to the city, with 
its hotel sector with full occupation, an opinion given ‘not ideologically, but as a 
businessman’ (Toledo 2001).  
The ascendancy of the PT to the presidency in 2003 altered its role in the WSF and 
led to the consolidation of a political position that helped shape the WSF’s development. 
From 2003 the ruling PT started to use the state machinery to extend funding to the 
Forum’s organisation, in particular through the deep pockets of the widely recognised state-
owned companies, firms the size of Petrobras, Banco do Brasil, the Post Office and the 
energy firm Electrobras, which by 2005 became official sponsors of the Forum (Lins Ribeiro 
2006; Teivainen 2002; Diaz 2006). That year there was a significant increase in the amount 
of municipal funding and a substantial decrease in state funding to the Forum, given that 
the new center-right government of the state, in the hands of the opposing party PMDB, 
had decided to cut the money assigned by the previous administration. Reports claimed that 
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the defeat of the PT in the state’s elections made organisers of the Forum lobby the PT-
controlled Federal government for support (Gerchmann 2002b), which decided to 
compensate for these cuts by allocating extra funds using the state companies as financial 
vehicles. The link between the WSF organisers and the leadership of these companies was 
quite robust: from 2003 to 2005 the Chairman of the Board of Petrobras was occupied by 
the Minister of Energy, Dilma Rousseff, the current president of Brazil, and the CEO was José 
Eduardo Dutra, a former union leader during the 1980s and president of the CUT. Dilma 
Rousseff was the Minister of Energy of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, where Porto Alegre is 
located, under Olivio Dutra’s administration between 1999 and 2002, the period when the 
two first Forums took place.  
Quite rapidly the association between the organisers of the Forum and the PT made 
the Forum a target for accusations of party politics. Even before the first Forum, the leader 
of the Democratic Labour Party PDT, a left-wing party associated with the Socialist 
International, called for public auditing of the PT’s expenditure on the Forum’s organisation 
process, stating that ‘...the objective can be very coherent, but the form in which it is being 
conducted in our country possesses a major deformity. It was given to the PT...’ with neither 
him nor his party invited to participate (Folha de S. Paulo 2001). This also created rifts inside 
the PT itself: in 2002 during the campaign for the governorship of the state, Tarso Genro, 
prefect of the city, accused his competitor Olivio Dutra, outgoing governor, of a ‘Stalinist’ 
use of the Forum, as the state television focused attention on Dutra and other party 
personalities but not on him (Gerchmann 2002a). Santos Elias (forthcoming) concludes that 
the participation of the PT in the WSF, even when aligned the Party’s original vision of 
providing institutional voice for the demands of social movements, was very much oriented 
towards party politics and the electoral agenda.  
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These observations are in stark contrast to many of the claims made in much of the 
existing work on the World Social Forum, which attribute to the PT similarly progressive and 
democratic attributes to those attributed to the WSF. Smith (2008: 146-7), for example, 
uses the example of the PT to support her claim that ‘political parties based in the global 
South may be more responsive and open to democratic participation.’ More specifically, the 
PT’s participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre is deemed to have embodied ‘a practical school 
of democracy’, making the city ‘a smart choice for hosting the World Social Forum’ 
(Teivainen 2002: 624-9).   
Perspectives such as these neglect the extent to which by the time the WSF was 
conceived the programmatic stance of the PT had transformed, becoming bureaucratised, 
professionalised and ideologically moderated. It was previously mentioned that this 
moderation developed from the mid-1990s and accelerated after Lula’s defeat in 1998. By 
2002 the PT’s official programme of government did not mention the word socialist or 
socialism, with Samuels (2004a: 1004) observing that the term ‘radical’ became reserved to 
political rather than economic notions, such as ‘radicalising Brazilian democracy’ or the 
‘radical defence of public welfare’. In 2002 Guido Mantega - one of Lula’s principal aides 
during the campaign, later appointed Minister of Planning and current Chairman of the 
Board of Petrobras under Dilma Rousseff - expressed the PT’s new economic vision in the 
following form: ‘I would put it [the PT] on this list of parties that aspire to and long for a 
capitalist society because socialism is totally undefined today; it no longer exists. We do not 
seek a more efficient capitalism, rather one made more human’ (quoted in Bianchi and 
Braga 2005: 1753). Journalists observed that despite big business remaining suspicious of 
the PT previous to the elections, Lula’s promises to stimulate housing credit, lower interest 
rates, and revitalise the capital market had drawn the attention of the financial sector (Rossi 
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2002). Furthermore, since 2000 the PT had continued transforming its financial resources 
model accepting significant donations from private companies, which quadrupled between 
2000 and 2004 (Ribeiro 2008: 104).   
In this regard, the political project advanced by the Lula campaign vis-à-vis the 2003 
elections was far from the radical visions some observers cast upon the PT’s involvement in 
the WSF, and was substantially closer to the moderate and collaborative views of the CSR 
movement. In July 2002 Grajew coordinated the signature of a support manifesto for Lula’s 
candidacy by businessmen (Zanini 2002). A few months later, Grajew was reported to 
endorse Lula’s view that his government would involve a ‘permanent dialogue over a new 
social encounter’, observing that a PT government would operate as a giant ‘sectoral 
chamber’ - grouping businessmen, workers and government - not only in relation to the 
economy but in social areas (Rossi 2002). In the months previous to the 2003 elections 
Grajew wrote another article titled ‘The Candidate of Businessmen’ in Folha de São Paulo, 
just as he had in 1998. The article again emphasised issues such as inequality, ethics and the 
consolidation of democracy. However, he made clear that businessmen should endorse the 
candidate committed to economic growth, employment and income distribution, a 
distribution that would ‘place more consumers, with greater income, in the market’ (Grajew 
2002). This candidate was, of course, Lula da Silva.    
The presidency of Lula catalysed the moderation of the PT, accentuating a dual 
model that supported both social policies and economic neoliberalism at the same time, 
coinciding with the moment the PT started to pass resources to the WSF in greater 
quantities. This approach by PT ‘in government’ was defined by its ability to ‘build a 
correlation between economic objectives and political objectives, guaranteeing the 
circularity of public policies that would rely on the economic to promote the social’ (Bianchi 
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and Braga 2005: 1745-62). To do so, the government combined compensatory policies and 
often clientelist practices, such as the co-optation of leaders of civil society, social 
movements and labour groups into the state bureaucracy. As previously indicated, the 
Brazilian democratic system had inclined towards inclusive mechanisms already in the 
1990s, leading some observers to consider that it had shaped a form of ‘council democracy’ 
(Alvarez 1997; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002). Nonetheless, the Lula administration 
expanded participatory institutions, spending unprecedented resources on building strong 
connections with civil society through new consulting mechanisms and participatory spaces 
(Hochstetler 2008; Avritzer 2010). Thus, the government became populated with labour and 
civil activists, with party members and CUT leaders receiving important positions in the 
government, public-owned companies, pension funds, and state-run banks (Ribeiro 2008; 
Alonso and Maciel 2010; Avritzer 2010; Carter 2010).4 But business was actively included in 
this process: Lula appointed more businessmen to ministerial positions than the previous 
‘neoliberal’ Cardoso (Schneider 2010): the Vice-Presidency during his two terms was 
occupied by José Alencar, the owner of Coteminas, the biggest textile group in Brazil, and an 
open supporter of neoliberal industrial policies, the Ministry of Agriculture went to the 
president of the Agri-business association, and the Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Trade to the chairman of the large food processing group Sadia.5  
This approach was described during the September 2011 20 Years ABONG 
Conference as ‘schizophrenic’ and reflective of a ‘social neoliberal’ model.6 André Singer, a 
political scientist and spokesman of the first Lula administration, considers that the 
bonapartism of Lulismo represents a pragmatic ‘third way’ that managed to reconcile the 
traditionally diverging interests of Brazilian popular sectors, middle class and elites (Singer 
2009). On the other hand, Francisco de Oliveira, a founder of the PT who left the party when 
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Singer joined the administration (Anderson 2011), instead put forward the figure of the 
‘platypus’ to describe the ‘inverted hegemony’ of the Lula government, based on the 
alliance between union and party bureaucracy with globalised financial capital (de Oliveira 
2006). Similar ideas are found in Bianchi and Braga’s (2005) notion of the Brazilian ‘social 
liberal state’ and Morais and Saad-Filho’s (2005) ‘Left Neoliberalism’. Moreover, Rollemberg 
Mollo and Saad-Filho (2006) evaluated the continuation of neoliberal economic policies in 
the Lula administration, claiming that they were ‘indistinguishable’ from Cardoso’s.   
This article proposes that the pro-social movement and pro-business approach that 
came to characterise the PT’s administration once in power was influential in the 
development of the WSF from its creation, since the party’s platform had already been 
transforming in the 1990s and this platform cohered with the vision of the CSR programme 
advanced by its corporate supporters. The pragmatist stance of the PT whereby it is not 
capitalism that should be rejected, but its unsustainable practices, matched the moderate 
stance advocated by the Brazilian corporate social responsibility movement around Ethos in 
the 1990s (Ethos 2011), and groups such as PNBE since the 1980s. Moreover, is it the same 
vision as that promoted by the UN since the late 1990s through initiatives such as the UN 
Global Compact promoting partnerships between private, public and civil actors in order to 
advance universal human and environmental standards (Annan 1998). The linkage between 
PT actors and the CSR movement was not merely programmatic or linked to the origins of 
the WSF: after its victory in 2003 Lula appointed Grajew - at the time President of the Ethos 
Institute and fundamental to mobilising business support for his presidential campaign7 - as 
Special Advisor to the Presidency, a position he occupied for less than a year, in charge of 
the relationship between private business and public policy (Castanheira 2004). 
Furthermore, he and three other board members of the Ethos Institute were selected to 
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participate in the influential Economic and Social Development Council (CDES) bringing 
together the Presidency, government officials, and civil society and business representatives 
(Ethos 2012).8 Both Grajew and the CEO of Petrobras – from 2005 to 2012 a position held by 
Sergio Gabrielli de Azevedo, another of the co-founders of the PT (Moura 2007) – occupy a 
place on the Governance Board of the UN Global Compact, and Lula himself gave the speech 
opening the Global Compact Leaders Summit in 2004 (UN Global Compact 2004).9   
Thus, while acknowledging the many and well-recorded social improvements 
achieved during this period by the socially-inclusive approach of the PT, it must be noted 
that the particular relations among the PT, a sector of business and civil society had a 
moderating effect in the origins and early evolution of the WSF, which from the outset was 
supported by a conglomeration of interests that shared a collaborative vision of civil society, 
state and business relations that did not reject capitalism. The ambivalence in the PT’s 
programme enabled Lula to be cheered by 100,000 people at the 2003 WSF (along with 
Hugo Chávez), and at the same time to become a protégé of big business, bankers, financial 
institutions and right-wing politicians, speaking at the World Economic Forum at Davos 
(Petras and Veltmeyer 2005), promoting the compatibility between liberal economic policies 
and social welfare.  
 From 2005 the ‘social neoliberal’ imprint of the PT in the WSF assumed a more 
controversial character, as the open involvement of the Brazilian state in the WSF coincided 
with the deterioration of the relationship between the PT and its conventional supporters, 
mainly following the corruption scandals that shook the Party and the disenchantment of its 
leftist allies with Lula’s economic policies (Sola 2008). In this period the intimate relationship 
between the WSF and the Brazilian state-business connection started to be openly criticised 
by certain participants and observers. Some noted that the WSF’s leadership opposed 
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granting greater visibility to more radical alternatives to ‘neoliberal globalisation’ such as 
those put forward by the government of Venezuela, the efforts of which towards funding 
the 2006 Caracas WSF met considerable resistance (Mestrum 2006). In 2005 Lula’s speech 
received lukewarm support, in contrast with Chavez’s standing ovation, and the PSTU (the 
Marxist Labour Party of Brazil) questioned on its website after that year’s event how the 
security arrangements concentrated on protecting the figure of Lula from insults or negative 
chants: 
A gigantic operation was put together involving the direction of the WSF, the 
federal, state and municipal governments, the Military Policy, the CUT and 
the MST. In the Gigantinho Gym, where the act was going to take place at 
9.00 am, the gates were opened covertly three hours before, for thousands 
of people brought by the CUT and MST wearing shirts with the slogan “100% 
Lula”. In this way they occupied almost all the space of the gym, leaving few 
places for the oppositions (all far from the podium). Every person out of this 
scheme who wanted to enter faced a queue of over a kilometre. What 
stopped entry to the gym was an organised manifestation. (PSTU 2005) 
Furthermore, the PT’s corruption scandals reached close to the Forum’s corporate sponsors: 
for instance, the person accused of being the financial articulator of the ‘mensalão’ 
corruption scheme, Marcos Valorio, owned the advertising agency SMPB handling the 
communication of state companies such as Petrobras, Furnas and Bank of Brazil. A 
parliamentary investigation in 2005 found several irregularities in the activities of SMPB in 
relation to funds passed to the WSF through these organisations (Serraglio 2006). ABONG 
claimed that it ignored that the money could have had irregular origins (Magalhães and Flor 
2009). On 9 October 2012, José Dirceu, co-founder of the PT, Lula’s first chief of staff and 
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one of the main PT personalities speaking at a panel during the 2003 WSF, was declared 
guilty of corruption charges and of arranging the ‘mensalão’ scheme, and sentenced to 10 
years in prison by the Brazilian Supreme Court of Justice (Oliveira and Passarinho 2012).   
The PT’s involvement in the WSF reached a point such that in an interview in 2010 
Eric Toussaint, leader of CADTM (Committee for the Annulment of Third World Debt), a 
member organisation of the WSF International Committee, voiced his concern when seeing 
the ‘Ten years Later’ Seminar in the last Porto Alegre Forum being sponsored by Petrobras, 
Caixa, Banco de Brasil, Itaipú Binational and a strong governmental presence, and 
considered that Brazil was using the Forum as part of a peripheral imperialist structure, 
raising and promoting the profile of its state corporations (Ojeda and Toussaint 2010). 
Moreover, he considered that a sector of the founders, comprising Grajew, Whitaker and 
IBASE, had come to represent a vision that intends to preserve the Forum as a space of 
dialogue and debate, open to many social actors, but not as an instrument of action. What 
this article demonstrates is that this approach to the WSF by certain Brazilian elements was 
there from the start, reflective of a moderate position compatible with the notion of social 
responsibility, which prefers voluntary and not coercive intervention over more mobilised 
and aggressive political tactics. This distinction corresponds with Prestes Rabelo’s (2006) 
identification of two competing factions present in the WSF’s spaces of decision-making: the 
‘horizontalists’ and the ‘movementalists’. The horizontalists, comprising Grajew, Whitaker 
and organisations like CBJP, CIVES and international sectors linked with Oxfam, Public 
Citizen and networks with strong linkages to civil society and business, may be considered to 
be moderates, representing the ideal of the founding group to move away from the vices of 
the ‘old’ movements and social organisations of the 20th century, in particular the influence 
of the international communist movement. This faction conceives the forum as a horizontal 
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and democratic space without clear leadership and free from orthodox utopias (Whitaker 
2004). The movementalists form a more heterogeneous group which conceives the forum as 
tool of action against neoliberalism, grouping organisations such as the World Network of 
Social Movements (created by initiative of the CUT and MST), CLACSO, ATTAC, women’s and 
unemployment groups, among others.  
This apparent paradox, whereby it is the moderate faction in the WSF which is more 
comfortable with the participation of state elements, including the (partially) public-owned 
companies, rather than the more radical sector, is resolved by understanding the 
relationship between the pro-social and pro-market model advanced by the PT and the 
Brazilian corporate social responsibility movement, which as this article has outlined were 
central in the origins of WSF. The voiced opposition to this arrangement expresses the way 
in which this ‘social neoliberal’ vision came to clash with certain sectors of civil society, both 
in Brazil and abroad that hold a view whereby ‘the WSF signals the spread of alternative 
socioeconomic relations and practices undertaken by ordinary men and women on a daily 
basis’ (Agathangelou and Ling 2009: 141). The roots of the WSF in a partisan elite promoting 
socially responsible capitalism tied in arm-length relations with pragmatic regional and later 
national governmental actors are far from this. 
 
Conclusion 
This article does not simply challenge the conventional account of the origins of the WSF 
predominantly in anti-capitalist social movements: by revealing the complex relations 
underlying its origins, this article has made explicit the constraining influence exercised by a 
certain Brazilian faction linking the WSF process with the PT and elements of business. 
These complex multi-sectoral relations help us to understand why the World Social Forum 
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developed from the outset as a forum for discussion, rather than as a mechanism for the 
advancement of more radical alternatives to neoliberal globalisation.  
This article also challenges the conventional critique of the WSF which claims that it 
has rejected its supposedly radical roots and descended into an NGO ‘trade fair’, as it has 
been shown not only that this moderation was present from the Forum’s inception, given 
the common approach shared by the corporate, civil and party political actors promoting 
the project, but that the involvement of these organised actors was fundamental for the 
Forum’s consolidation. 
 The prevalence of moderate stances inside the WSF responds in large part to the 
ideological and institutional relationship developed locally between the progressive wing of 
business and certain sectors of civil society, supported by the (re-)positioning of the PT in 
the last two decades from a programmatic party to a pragmatic one as it gained higher 
political offices (Hunter 2007). The impact this conjunction of actors had in the early 
evolution of the WSF renders highly questionable the notion that the WSF stemmed purely 
‘from below’.  
For these reasons, this article has contributed towards a more sophisticated 
understanding of the WSF as a complex political project influenced by and articulating 
different sectoral and national interests: it is not merely an expression of an alternative 
global civil society or of the opposition of the South to Northern hegemony, nor it can be 
said to be spearheading an anti-capitalist rebellion. Rather, by exploring the particularity of 
the Brazilian institutional relations crossing the WSF, the article has argued that a dyadic 
‘above versus bottom’ view of the origins and early development of the WSF, as well as an 
‘hegemony versus counter-hegemony’ or a ‘society versus business’ one, not only simplifies 
the historical and ideological complexity of Brazilian politics, and international politics more 
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generally, but also reproduces a liberal stereotype that frames ‘the South’ as the home of 
plural grassroots movements, independent civil society and counter-hegemonic political 
projects – a characterisation all too common in existing work on global civil society. 
This framing ends up performing the conservative function it intends to reject – 
locking certain actors and regions in certain roles – while missing the structures enabling an 
undoubtedly novel space such as the WSF to materialise in the first place. Shedding light on 
these complex social arrangements, whereby social roles, interests and ideologies do not 
reflect the competitive social relations presumed by liberal pluralism has the potential to 
provide insights into other contexts beyond Brazil and to other projects beyond the WSF. 
Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the overlapping of roles is not 
necessarily a defect, as novel and politically-enabling alternatives can emerge and prosper 
from a set of institutional arrangements which may be assumed to be regressive. Some 
elements in the WSF have been undoubtedly part of the struggle for a fairer economic 
system, for a more egalitarian society and/or more responsible business, but at the same 
time there are party politics, ideological struggles, corporate interests, and Brazilian geo-
political ambitions.  
Hence, this article highlights how attributing ontological reality to analytical 
distinctions can be both problematic and reductive even in what may be considered to be 
the most emblematic of cases. The evidence of the WSF process indicates that the 
temptation to consider the development of ‘globalisation from below’ and of global civil 
society from the ‘bottom up’ without due consideration of the role of elites in the business 
sector, political parties, and regional and national government must be avoided.  
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1
 Corporatism is defined as a system of state-group relations where the state encourages the formation of a 
limited number of officially recognised, non-competing, state-supervised groups, shaping a non-pluralistic 
system of representation (Schmitter 1974).  
2
 Interestingly, in 1994 the then leader of IBASE, the Brazilian sociologist and activist Betinho, was asked to 
support the candidacy of Lula in that year’s presidential race, which ended in defeat. Betinho refused citing the 
PT’s statist tendencies and preferring an independent and radical civil activism. The person who asked for this 
support was Grajew (Pandolfi and Heymann 2005: 215). 
3
 Grajew and his allies were expelled from the organisation, where some occupied relevant positions, as they 
were considered a faction rejecting the centralised structure (Bianchi 2001). 
4
 Ribeiro (2008: 277) states that certain estimates counted 1,400 PT members in the federal government 
alone, over 200 in the states and nearly 900 in municipalities, with the opposition claiming figures of around 
20,000 people in total. 
5
 As de Oliveira (2006: 12) characterised it ‘notorious businessmen - in their capacity as “representatives of 
civil society” - were awarded ministries appropriate to their areas of interest and export ranking’.  
6
 The first author conducted interviews at this conference in September 2011. The literature has observed how 
Lula maintained the many of the market-friendly policies started at the end of the nineties by Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (Cardoso and Gindin 2009; Sola 2008). 
7
 In July 2002 this group launched a public manifesto supporting Lula’s campaign claiming that he represented 
‘...the only alternative to implement a government programme inclined towards economic growth with 
employment generation, reduction of inequalities, strengthening of the domestic market and support to 
national firms’ (Scinocca 2006; Folha Online 2002). 
8
 For a study of its relevance, see Dotor (2007). 
9
 Some local authors observed how in Brazil, the acceptance of this overlapping between corporate and social 
responsibility facilitated this duality (Grün 2005). 
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